As if to emphasise this, on September 20, the government notified FDI in retail, aviation, broadcast and power exchanges despite the shutdown called by the opposition. On Sept 21, a few hours after the Trinamool Congress withdrew support from his government, reducing it to a minority, Singh told the people in a nationally-televised address that money did not grow on trees and thus one should be prepared for hard decisions. Implicit in the address is the assertion that he can do the job.
What are the parallels and dissimilarities between Narasimha Rao’s minority government in 1991 and Manmohan Singh‘s today?
The Narasimha Rao government survived as a minority for two years—from 1991 to 1993—without any outside support. The Congress had won 232 seats in the 1991 Lok Sabha polls and its ally, the AIADMK, had won 11, rendering the coalition well short of a majority. It was only when a no-confidence motion was moved against the government in July 1993 that Rao assembled new allies like Ajit Singh’s Rashtriya Lok Dal and the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), the latter being remembered more for the infamous JMM bribery case.
Rao survived the vote, but much later he was convicted for corruption, bribery and criminal conspiracy, the only prime minister in history to be so convicted. He died before his appeal could be disposed of.
In 2009, in the current Lok Sabha, the Congress won 205 seats, much less than what it had in 1991. But given the numbers achieved with the help of coalition partners, the total soared to around 325. Before Mamata withdrew support, Manmohan Singh‘s was a majority government.In 1991, Rao, in the aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, was the default gainer in the top job. In UPA-2, Singh had as much a share in the Congress’ mandate as party chief Sonia Gandhi, thanks to the role he played in the nuclear deal.
Unlike his mentor Rao, Singh does not have to worry about numbers and political management. That is a task left to the party machinery under the Congress president. The division of responsibilities may have its pitfalls but has worked well for key stakeholders in the Congress.
Four years ago, when UPA-1 faced it own trust vote, it came up against the cash-for-votes scam in July 2008. But unlike Rao, Singh could claim with a certain innocence that he had no knowledge of votes being traded.
UPA-1 survived because, after the Left Front withdrew support, the Samajwadi Party discovered a belated virtue in the Indo-US civil nuclear deal. Later, when the ardour cooled, it was former Samajwadi General Secretary Amar Singh, who was blamed for it. And, in a twist from the old tale, it was the supposed whistle-blowers in the cash-for-votes scam—politicians from the BJP—who landed in jail.
Running a minority government extracts a price, in whatever form. Floor managers of ruling parties know that better than anyone else. Each time the government has to get a crucial bill passed or if at all there is a vote on FDI in Parliament, the government’s floor managers will have to go through the difficult exercise of having Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati on board. Smaller parties like Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and Jharkhand Vikas Morcha, with two members each, have started making noises on FDI. They would also need to be talked to.
At the end of Rao’s government in 1996, Manmohan Singh survived as a reformer while Rao’s reputation perished after the Congress lost power. The Congress and Manmohan Singh will be hoping that Singh’s recall of 1991 will not end the way it did in 1996: with the PM discredited and the party defeated.
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