An
interesting and long over-due discourse by Maj Gen G. D. Bakshi (Retd)
about the factors that got us independence from the British. It is a happy augury
which merges well with emerging realities.
You may read
and ponder if you like.
Ashok Coomar
Gandhi-Nehru soft power not sole
reason behind freedom
Maj Gen G.D. Bakshi (Retd)
15th Nov 2014
[In strictly historical terms,
Subhas Bose emerges as
primarily responsible for Indian
independence, even more perhaps than Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.]
Nation states are constructed
around a core of seminal
ideas and values. They need a
national narrative to sustain themselves and serve as a basis for their
collective identity that defines who they are and what they stand for. This
national narrative is usually based upon the historical path of evolution of
that state.
The national narrative that the
Indian state evolved for itself at the time of its independence, averred that
unlike all other Westphalian states that are based upon a monopoly of violence
and hard power, the Indian state was unique and exceptional.
It was not based upon hard power,
but on the soft power concepts of ahimsa, non-violence, soul force etc.
This is how it claimed it had won
its freedom — not by any exercise of hard power or violence, but by
non-violent persuasion and peaceful agitations.
This national narrative was based
upon a falsehood that went against the facts of our recent history.
The 125th birth anniversary of
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is an apt occasion for such historical reflection.
Nehru's seminal contribution to India was to make it a viable and functioning
democracy.
However, Nehru was a disaster as
far as national security is concerned.
It is also vital to understand how
the creed of pacifism came to disable the Indian polity.
Before Gandhi came from South
Africa, the Congress party was largely an effete, debating society. The
Congress asked for home rule and dominion status and sought strenuously to
remain on the right side of the colonial regime by trumpeting their loyalty to
the King-Emperor.
However, the upsurge of nationalism
in India became very strong, especially after the First World War, when over
a million Indian soldiers came back from the battlefields in Europe, Middle
East and Africa.
It was these demobilised soldiers
who spread the nascent idea of nationalism in India and especially the Punjab
from where a large segment of the soldiery had come.
The Indians expected gratitude for their
participation in the war.
What they got in 1919 was
Jallianwala Bagh massacre.
A far more militant response came
thereafter in terms of the Ghadar movement of Indian
revolutionaries.
Gandhi was an astute judge of the
Indian scenario. He gave a mass base and populist impetus to the Congress
programmes and mobilised the rural masses.
Mahatma Gandhi, however, was shrewd
enough to understand the unpreparedness of the highly fragmented Indian
population for an armed struggle to overthrow British colonial rule.
Hence, he tried to make a virtue of
necessity by insisting on a non-violent freedom movement based on the
psychological tools of satyagraha, fasts, moral pressure and the values of
ahimsa or non-violence, designed not to cross the thresholds of tolerance of
the colonial power.
Frankly, it is now evident from
hindsight that the British tacitly encouraged this non-violent, persuasive form
of protest because they were convinced that it was not going to basically
endanger their colonial rule.
The extensive press coverage given
to Mahatma Gandhi and his non-violent freedom movement based on peaceful
demonstrations, fasts and dharnas, was designed to release the pent up energy
of popular dissatisfaction with colonial rule, but at the same time, prevent it
from turning very violent.
That violence would have endangered
the colonial dispensation.
Non-violence did not, and hence it
was tolerated.
So even while the Congress
tom-tommed its nationalist credentials and abhorrence for colonial rule, they
openly admired the British system and were in turn seen by the colonial masters
as "Brown Sahibs" and closet anglophiles in a nationalist disguise
— who the British tried to exploit as very convenient tools for the
perpetuation of the Raj.
They acted as a safety valve for
the popular sentiments and prevented the outbreak of large scale violence in
India.
Otherwise, the British found this
effete and ersatz form of nationalism very convenient and entirely manageable.
The only Indian in the National
Congress, who could challenge the overriding authority of the Mahatma, was
Subhas Chandra Bose.
He was a realist.
He clearly foresaw that
non-violence was absolutely within the tolerance thresholds of the colonial
regime.
This could mount media and
psychological pressure but never of an order which would really compel the
British to leave.
Bose opposed the Mahatma Gandhi
strategy of peaceful protest alone.
He became the Congress president
despite Gandhi's opposition. However, the astute Mahatma ensured that Bose did
not serve a second term as Congress president.
The Bose thesis was realist and
simple.
World War II had started in 1939.
2.5 million Indian soldiers had voluntarily joined the British Indian Army to
fight Britain's wars in Europe, North Africa, Italy and in Burma. The entire
Burma theatre was manned by the Indian forces of the empire.
Bose emerges as the most remarkable
personality of India's freedom struggle.
He dared to oppose Mahatma Gandhi's
grand strategy and was marginalised politically. However, he now broke ranks
and single-handedly put his ideas into action with emphatic and momentous
results.
The key to the colonial control
of its empire was the British Indian Army.
The British colonial success
hinged upon their ability to "nativise" this Army.
Over 80% of this colonial Army
consisted of Indian peasant soldiers, who remained staunchly loyal to the Raj
because of the oath of fidelity they had taken to the King-Emperor.
The British organised them in
ethnicity/sub-nationality based regiments, focused upon a narrow manpower base
in distinct geographical areas of India.
They celebrated and highlighted
these distinct local military traditions to evoke fierce regimental/clan
loyalties.
Good British officer leadership at
the junior and middle levels did the rest and helped to forge good combat units
that served as an efficient and infallible instrument of colonial control.
Bose was crystal clear that the key
to Indian Independence lay in turning the loyalty of the Indian sepoys of the
British Indian Army.
He was absolutely certain that without
this native backbone, colonial rule could not last a day.
It was the true centre of gravity
of the Indian freedom struggle.
In the classical Kautilyan
tradition, Bose decided that an enemy's enemy is a logical ally.
India must seek the help of Germany
and Japan for its fight against the British.
Only then would the fight be
effective and stand any chance of success.
Mahatma Gandhi felt this was
morally repugnant.
In fact, the Quit India movement
launched by him had completely petered out by 1944.
The Japanese meanwhile were causing
a major upheaval in Asia. After the conquest of most of China and Korea, Japan
now turned its attention to the British and other European colonies in South
East Asia. It attacked and captured the Philippines Islands and captured
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. It then invaded Burma and reached the
borders of British India. Now, it trained its sights on the brightest jewel in
the British Crown.
It is was here that the Japanese
Army felt the need for Bose, who alone, they felt, could tilt the scales by
arousing the 2.5 million men of the British Indian Army against their colonial
masters.
Bose had staged a miraculous escape
to Germany where he had raised the 3,000 men strong Indian League.
The Japanese, therefore, asked the
Germans to send Bose.
He undertook a perilous submarine
voyage and reached Japan. In Japan, Bose met Gen Tojo and other Japanese
leaders.
He assumed command of the Indian
National Army (INA). He formed the provisional government of Azad Hind in exile at
Singapore and declared war against Great Britain.
He went far beyond the prisoner of
war pool with the Japanese Army and appealed to the vast Indian diaspora in
South East Asia.
He evoked a massive response in
terms of recruitment and financial and gold donations to fund the freedom
struggle. He expanded this rudimentary force to an impressive size of some
1,500 officers and 60,000 men. This force was organised
into three combat divisions. Two of these were to take part in the fighting in
Burma and the historic invasion of Imphal-Kohima. The third garrisoned Malaya
and later had a contingent in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
A recent poll by the National Army
Museum in London, in fact, has described the
Imphal-Kohima battle as the most decisive battle of British Military history.
It was "greatest" in
terms of its political, social and cultural impact. Some 24,000 men of the
INA were killed in the operations in Burma — hardly a non-violent
struggle.
Far more important than the
immediate impact of a decisive operational defeat for the Japanese-INA combined
forces was its aftershock that shook the loyalties of 2.5 million Indian
soldiers who were being demobilised at the end of the war.
By then, the INA story had leaked
out. There were large scale
mutinies in the Royal Indian Navy and in the British Indian Army. Some 78
ships, 20 shore establishments and over 20,000 sailors of the Royal Indian Navy
were involved.
The spectre of armed revolts
amongst 2.5 million Indian soldiers being demobilized, shook the British Empire
to its roots.
There were hardly 40,000 British
troops in India then.
Such a massive revolt meant the
end of the British Empire in India. The war weary British saw the writing on
the wall and decided to leave.
Indian freedom had not come from
non-violence but from the very real spectre of large scale revolt and armed
violence.
Frankly, in strictly historical
terms, Bose emerges as primarily responsible for Indian independence —
even more perhaps than Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru.
This is borne out by the testimony
of the-then British Prime Minister Clement Attlee.
[ COMMENT : Please see
below ]
Despite this, to fight the ghost
of the INA and its legendary founder, Nehru created the contrived myth about
how soft power alone had single handedly got India its freedom. He actually
believed his own myth and this led him to virtually despise the military and he
did his best to emasculate it.
As a trained lawyer, he had great
faith in his oratory to move the UN and other international bodies. This new
legal paradigm, he felt, would rule the discourse between nations and the use
of force would be eliminated. Hence, his soft power alone would suffice and
India needed no standing armed forces, only police forces.
The J&K war in 1947-48 and the
Hyderabad operations made it impossible for him to have his way and realists
like Vallabhbhai Patel were able to dissuade him.
After Patel's demise, Nehru's
pathological dislike for the army came to the fore, especially after the
military coup in Pakistan.
He set about emasculating the
military leadership, starving the military of resources and set in train the
tragic events that would bring about the humiliation of 1962.
He could not live it down and died
a broken man.
Fortunately, his successors, especially
his daughter, turned realist with a vengeance and saved the Republic.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELATED PLEASE :
[FROM THE PAGES OF HISTORY ]
When
B.P. Chakravarti was acting as
Governor of West Bengal, Lord Attlee visited India and stayed as his guest for
three days at the Raj Bhavan.
Chakravarti asked Attlee about
the real grounds for granting independence to India.
Specifically, his question was,
when the Quit India movement lay in ruins years before 1947 where was the need
for the British to leave in such a hurry.
Attlee’s response is most
illuminating and important for history. Here is the Governor’s account of
what Attlee told him:
In reply Attlee cited several
reasons, the most important were the activities of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose which weakened the very
foundation of the attachment of the Indian land and naval forces to the British
Government.
Towards the end, I asked Lord
Attlee about the extent to which the British decision to quit India was
influenced by Gandhi’s activities.
On hearing this question
Attlee’s lips widened in a smile of disdain and he uttered, slowly,
putting emphasis on each single letter – “mi-ni-mal.”
(Emphasis added.)
Comments